

RESEARCH PROPOSAL

# PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN AMONG CHINESE YOUTH

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## Perceptions of Japan among Chinese Youth

### **ABSTRACT:**

Numerous accounts and interpretations of the violent, anti-Japanese protests which occurred in several cities across mainland China in April of 2005 have been published, yet to date there has been no systematic study of the causes of these phenomena. In a country well-known for extreme suppression of both protests and public opinion in general, the fact that the CCP granted groups permission to protest, and the prevalence of strongly-worded opinions posted online on the subject of Japan suggest that the topic presents a ripe opportunity to gauge Chinese public opinion accurately on a regionally vital and globally important issue. Especially when such sentiment is so prevalent, the extent to which an individual in China holds such beliefs may also provide an indirect measure of one's ethnic, national identity, an additional topic of vital interest in a country with a minority population of over 100 million whose self-identities cannot be queried directly without considerable risk to all involved. The content of this proposal seeks to outline the theories and methods which would be employed to gain a clearer picture of the causes, manifestations, and consequences of Chinese hostility toward Japan among the volatile 八零后 *ba ling hou* (post-1980) generation of Mainland Chinese in the PRC and in the Chinese diaspora.

### **INTRODUCTION:**

"Ask a Chinese person to name a color, and he'll say 'red'. Ask him to name an animal, and he'll say 'tiger'. Ask for a person, and he'll name 'Mao Zedong'," -often heard, and perhaps official quotation, intended to show the unity of the Chinese people.

Chinese themselves often use the above quotation to show that the 1.3 billion citizens of the PRC are of one mind and one identity, yet they would not likely appreciate the near-monolithic and negative treatment of their population by Western media. When the local inhabitants of 1/3 of a great nation's territory would prefer to be separate and independent, and its non-democratically elected leadership is struggling for legitimacy even among its ethnic majority, such a monolithic status must be less than inevitable, and perhaps also inappropriate. In some variations of the opening statement, "Japan", is added as an adversary that almost any Chinese on the street would be quick to submit. Given the recent and vociferous proclamations of anti-Japanese sentiment on the Mainland, it has been largely assumed that this unified sense of "otherness" which Japan unintentionally provides is one of very few substantial and defining features of

what it means to be Chinese, an opinion which is assumed not only to be prevalent and popular, but also nearly universal across the population.

The research project proposed herein seeks to verify and clarify this sentiment empirically, through the applications of mass surveys and focus groups across differing geographic, ethnic, and other populations more representative of the Chinese diaspora's diversity. It seeks to answer more systematically a posted question on an online college student forum, answered largely in the affirmative, "Is it wrong *not* to hate Japan?"

## BACKGROUND:

**Theoretical Guidance: Alterity and Nationalism.** This proposal draws its theoretical impetus from the concepts of "otherness" and nationalism, both having intense and unique applications in the current state of Chinese affairs. Jian Yang (2007) notes that China's exceptional status as quite outside the mainstream of political theory and empirical study is a source of both frustration and pride, though a basic theoretical foundation in these two concepts will provide a useful means of interpreting and incorporating this project in the scholarly context. For considerations of space, however, they can only be mentioned in the simplest of terms. Though condescension is the farthest from our intent, the reader offended by patronizing oversimplification may be encouraged to skip ahead.

Hegel, the German philosopher, is largely credited with bringing the concept of "the other" into scholarly discourse as a component of cognitive consciousness of one's "self". Defining one's identity can be aided if there is someone else nearby who may be similar--but is best when in antithetical opposition--but is clearly not like oneself. This concept, when extended from the individual to national level of analysis creates a national identity which, when accompanied by pride and desire to advance national interests, becomes nationalism. This nationalism paired with any "other" forms the basis for much international conflict. In the English language, one is often encouraged from an early age through state-sponsored education to differentiate between nationalisms of the "self" or motherland as patriotism, and of "the other", whose nationalism is called just that and is often portrayed disparagingly as dangerous, irrational, or otherwise inferior. Naturally this semantic distinction is lessened, though not always absent, in objective scholarship, while state governments or popular nationalist groups are more likely to emphasize it.

The fourth edition of Oxford Advanced Learners English-Chinese Dictionary lists three iterations of nationalism in Chinese: 1. 爱国心 *aiguo xin*, which is most commonly used in the Western scholarly and popular sense of patriotism, literally "love of one's country in one's heart", but shows no lack of Chinese patriotism when Chinese people use it in reference to nationalism outside of China. 2. 国家主义 *guojia zhuyi*, the most literal translation of which the first half is

"nation" and the second the "-ism" suffix. 3. 民族主义 *minzu zhuyi* is a fascinating linguistic challenge, unique to the Peoples Republic of China and other countries containing large, stateless national groups. Its meaning is akin to "racism" in the sense of racial or ethnic pride with scarcely any negative connotations. *Minzu* is used almost synonymously as nation, nationality, or race in the sense of delineating the official "56 nationalities" of China (see APPENDIX G), the Han constituting the majority and what most people think of as Chinese, comprising over 90% of the population. A historical application of this third meaning could be given in the ethnic Han nationalism partly responsible for resistance and overthrow of the "foreign" Yuan and Qing Dynasties, whose emperors were not ethnically Han Chinese but rather of the Mongolian and Manchurian nationalities, respectively.

An introduction to the concepts of popular and state nationalism in a contemporary Chinese context and from the perspective of a Beijing University student (Yu, 2007) is a good place to start, for an adulterated first-hand source less constrained by Western bias than its grammar. Suisheng Zhao's book (2004) is a step up in scholarly detail and away from sino-centrism, examining the component parts of contemporary, constructed Chinese nationalism of both varieties.

Numerous sources, some cited in the bibliography (APPENDIX H), note how nationalism can be used by state governments to wield its population forcefully in relation to other nations, often in terms of mobilization for war. All scholarly articles referring to Chinese nationalism point to the use of state-sponsored nationalism as an instrument of maintaining regime legitimacy, especially important in a non-democratic state whose previously unifying and legitimizing ideology of communism has eroded almost completely over the past 25 years. A synthesis of history, the acrimonious propinquity of the Japanese "other", and pre-existing popular nationalism provides the Chinese Communist Party with an extraordinarily sharp instrument aptly and frequently referred to as a double-edged sword. As Yinan He (2007) puts it, "...by lashing out at Japan's amnesia about its past aggression toward China, Beijing could depict Japan as an immoral 'other' and thus restore the internal cohesion of the 'self', the Chinese nation, and assuage public resentment toward the government." Western newspapers reporting on the 2005 anti-Japanese protests in China focused almost solely on this edge of the sword, and it came as a great surprise to many when party leadership suddenly made what appeared to be a 180-degree turn in moving to quash this nationalistic display.

Other examples of "othering" which are better known to Westerners include anti-Semitism, white supremacy, and anti-Japanese sentiment which was likely just as virulent in the USA during WWII as in China throughout most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Yet among these examples, perhaps only in the case of anti-Semitic fascism in Nazi Germany was an "other" so closely tied to nationalism and the concept of national identity, as held by the majority of the population, as in China today.

**History.** Numerous accounts of modern Chinese history are listed in the bibliography in APPENDIX H, but an extremely brief summary of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in China will provide useful reference points for the sections which follow. Many accounts of modernity begin with the loss of the Opium Wars to England under the Qing Dynasty in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, setting in motion what is seen by the Chinese, whose very name suggests a superiority as 中国 *zhong guo* the “Center Kingdom”, as an anomalous and embarrassing period when the previous world order of the previous 5000 years was reversed. As part of a long decline, the Manchurian minority Qing Dynasty faced a majority Han challenge of legitimacy in the Taiping Rebellion, the “unequal treaty” of Shimonoseki after the first Sino-Japanese War at the turn of the century granted Manchuria to the Japanese as a puppet state, and the decaying Qing fell decisively in 1911. Following great power struggles, Dr. Sun Yat Sen declared the foundation of a Chinese Republic in 1917, which was short-lived and led to Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalists assuming control and attempting to put down the newly-formed Chinese Communist Party (CCP), marginally led with considerable Soviet support by Mao Zedong, before uniting to resist Japanese Imperialism in WWII. World War Two is often referred to by the Chinese as the Second War of Japanese Resistance or Second Sino-Japanese War, as the majority of Eastern China had been colonized by Japan for much of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century until the end of WWII.

A civil war between the Nationalists and Communists followed, with the defeated Chiang Kai Shek and remaining Nationalist army fleeing to Taiwan and the victorious Mao Zedong declaring a triumph of the Chinese people and the founding of the PRC on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1949, the day and week currently celebrated by the PRC as its most important national holiday. Close ties with the USSR and an obsession by Mao to use his style of Chinese communism to catch up with the industrialized world led to the “Great Leap Forward” and famines in the 1950’s and total rejection of traditional and Western influences during the “Cultural Revolution” of the 1970’s. Both fueled by fervent nationalism and the personality cult of Mao, these succeeded only in isolating China and destroying its economy, and after Mao’s death in 1976, the previously discredited and demoted Deng Xiaoping assumed the leading role of chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Deng has been remembered as a pragmatic reformer responsible for moving the economy back onto a track of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” which has been unmasked in recent times as a truly unique form of Chinese capitalism, as expanded by the succeeding chairmen Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the current PRC President constrained by continued influence from the former.

**Sino-Japanese Relations: Wars, Colonization, Protests.** Useful books on modern and contemporary relations include works by Wan (2006), Rose (2005), and Yan (2004). All include extensive treatment of the violent history of the past century, with consideration of the enduring legacy of major events as the Sino-Japanese Wars, including the *de facto*

annexation of Manchuria, colonization of the east coast and Taiwan, and the Nanjing Massacre of 1937. Jian Yang (2007) describes the current relations between China and Japan as “politically cold and economically hot”, creating a highly tenuous balancing act for the leadership of the CCP, as is mentioned above in the introduction to Chinese nationalism. Current relations are treated thoroughly and colorfully from a variety of nationalist and other sources in chapter 6 of Shirk's (2007) book, *China: Fragile Superpower*.

There is considerable controversy within the overlapping fields of history, Asian studies, and political science as to the nature of Chinese protests--against Japan, the USA, and the CCP. The last is clearly the greatest concern of Chinese leadership, as the reputation for brutal repression of protests stems from the 1989 student movement and massacre in Tiananmen Square attests, perpetuated by the ongoing, increasing instances of rural protests against “land-grabs” by local government officials. That these are neither allowed without permits from the public security bureaus--having great incentives to deny them---and are extremely difficult to publicize due to state censorship, make for understandable obstreperosity and attention from Western media and scholars thirsty for any signs of mass dissent and government weakness in this largest propaganda state. Wasserstrom (2005) does well to note a pattern in Chinese student protests over the last century, and with the target most often being Japan the implication is that the latest round is nothing to get too excited about.

Individual issues affecting contemporary Sino-Japanese relations have also been treated extensively in the past several years and so are worth noting here. Visits by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Japan's Yasukuni Shrine, which honors war criminals among other WWII dead, and the negative political effects of this throughout Asia are noted by Lam (2005). Strecker Downs (1998-1999) treats the disputed territory of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands claimed by both nations. Yanan He's (2007) WWII memory article addresses the issues of a formal apology from Japan, conservative Japanese school textbooks “whitewashing” atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre and leaving behind chemical weapons after leaving China--all brought back into public view by new museums, education policies, and other propagandistic pushes.

The sincerity of ostensibly furious students is a highly contentious topic in the scholarly literature, with the more empirical studies suggesting there is much more at hand than the issues on the protesters' street signs. Yu and Zhao (2006) come to the conclusion, rather taking the wind out of alarmists' sails, that individual participation in the 1999 anti-USA Beijing student protests was more a function of roommate peer pressure and desire to have a “protest experience” than any deep hatred against the USA or even real anger for having bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the catalyst for putting students on the street, as reported by most media. Similarly, Dong's (2006) individual interviews

with Anti-Japanese student protesters from the spring incidents of 2005, while using only six cases is far too small to generalize, indicate a much more self-centered desire for status among peers, imaginations stimulated by the internet, accompanied by skepticism of both popular and state nationalism as portrayed by mainstream Chinese media.

**2005 Protests: Mainstream Media Hype? Abuse of new technology?** A veritable flood of both Chinese and international media attention surrounded the build-up to, violence and suppression of the 2005 anti-Japanese protests. The vast amount of coverage itself is a partial explanation for the subsequent outpouring of articles treating the topic more academically and related to theory, as cited here. This may be an example of scholarly opportunism, as it is not certain whether scholars are seizing upon a massively hyped non-issue under total control of the CCP, or if there have been real consequences of the events of 2005 with broad implications for the future of Sino-Japanese relations.

The role of the internet must be central to any study of the recent protests. Mooney (2005) notes how the internet is used by tech-savvy young Chinese to feed popular nationalism, predicting future outbursts. The Asian Wall Street Journal (Xiao, 2005) attributed the protests directly to young men with higher income, free time, and access to technology. All of these feed into a quasi-theory of 愤青 *fengqing* or “angry young men”, cited by among Chinese society and scholars such as Yinan He (2007) as an explanation for the surge of popular nationalism and its manifestations in near-spontaneous protests. Technology is not only used by the student organizers, participants, and other angry young men, but of course also by the massive propaganda wing of the CCP, constructing what has been referred to as “The Great Firewall of China”. Barme (2005) notes that the police used mass text messages, urging calm and threatening arrests, to stop the protests. The initial advantage held by extreme cyber-nationalists in China, while not evaporated, has certainly been attenuated as the CCP has enacted strong countermeasures to censor, censure, and even detain these individuals, often removing online material it deems potentially destabilizing--extending into almost anything political or not in agreement with the party line. This manner of controlling popular nationalism by co-opting it or censoring it outright is cited as evidence that the current wave of nationalism is no longer encouraged by the state, as it was apparently in the 1980's-90's, but is still very much under state control.

**Previous studies of Chinese Public Opinion toward Japan.** Research on Chinese public opinion remains in a nascent phase, and there is considerable reason to question the validity of all quantitative research done in the PRC. Despite claims from the Party, the public, and even scholars as to the improvements in openness for dialog and news reporting, China continues to rank in the lowest tier with the most oppressive countries as given by the Reporters Without Borders organizaion (see Wikipedia), and the danger of criticizing any level of government remains closely correlated with the sensitivity of the issue. Yet scholars such as Tong Lam (Jensen, 2007) point to several studies undertaken post-2000 which

could be considered both successful and more accurate than any previous, making frequent note of the impossibility of such “even a decade ago”. David Lampton (2001) concurs that the role of public opinion in foreign policy-making is growing, noting that in certain issues the public feels strongly about, the government’s range of options is greatly narrowed.

Small and medium-scale case studies on the subject of anti-Japanese sentiment have been undertaken by Dong (2006) and an unknown group in the affluent Guangdong Province (Mei, 2007). The latter survey had only 200 participants and found: almost 90% of Guangdong students disapprove of Japan joining the UN Security Council, yet only 9% supported a boycott of Japanese goods. On the conflicting issues mentioned in the Sino-Japanese relations section, 56% were satisfied with the Chinese government’s actions, while a significant minority of 36% thought they should do more. 70% of Guangdong students “appreciated the patriotism” of cyber-nationalist angry young men, while many fewer at 17% actually supported their “actions” (not clear what these actions were). The summary of the survey ends with strong nationalist prescriptions, more likely the opinions of the authors than conclusions from their data, about building a stronger China which can stand up to Japanese bullies.

The results of a bilateral student survey accompanying the 2007 “ice breaking” diplomatic visit to Japan by premier Wen Jiabao are reported by the respected online periodical 中国社会观察网 *Zhongguo Shehui Guancha Wang* Lookinto China (Huang, 2007). This study of 1000 students in both China and Japan found a condition of mutual antagonism and distrust, slightly stronger on the Chinese side. 56% of Chinese students gave their impressions of Japan as either “bad” or “very bad”, with only 7.8% choosing “very good” or “good”.

One is tempted to draw conclusions of censorship in terms of the sensitivity of this issue, as the link used by Reilly (2006) to previous domestic public opinion surveys on Japan in China is not valid. The link to the Guangdong survey, which the primary researcher had translated only weeks ago, is now also misbehaving. These examples attest to a need for a Western database which will be stably available and accessible to scholarship of non-Chinese readers.

The past two years have produced results of international polling agencies on the opinions of Japan among the general Chinese population. The World Public Opinion Program on International Policy Attitudes (2006), conducted in summer of 2006 on nearly 2,000 individuals, found that 79% of China had “little or no trust in Japan” to act “responsibly”, and half thought relations were worsening (compared to only 15% for Sino-U.S. relations). A month later, Pew (2006) sampled nearly the same number and found 70% with an “unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” view of Japan (compared to 43% for the USA), 67% saw China’s relationship with Japan as “adversarial” or a “serious problem”, 81% thought Japan hadn’t apologized enough for WWII, 78% opposed Koizumi visiting Yasukuni Shrine, and 71% thinking Japan’s world



influence is “mainly negative”.

Previous years’ studies become scarce rather quickly. Pew took one measure in 2005, finding a peak of 76% of China with an “unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” view of Japan. A BBC study in 2004 found that 51% percent of Chinese opposed Japan joining the UN Security Council, a number vastly different from the Guangdong student survey of 2007. A very strange and smaller Harris Poll of 500 in 1999 asked how best to “describe Japan”, and by far the two most popular responses, among choices of which none were negative, were “major economic power” with 52% and “financial situation highest priority” at 29% of those surveyed. The earliest, and only other international survey results listed in the Polling the Nations database asking China about Japan was taken by Gallup England (1995), with no sampling details but showing that almost no Chinese find Japanese products to be of poor quality, with 23% giving no response and 73% ranking them as between “good” and “excellent”.

**Problems with Previous Studies, Current Controversies, Need for Further Research.** There are a number of competing camps for the lens through which to view the recent upsurge in anti-Japanese nationalism in China. In coming closest to *equating* Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment, Yeh-Chung Lu (2006) concludes that everything is completely under the control of the CCP. His view is echoed in the Chinese media, as an article in the Epoch Times (Qi, 2004) claims that Anti-Japanese sentiment in China has been exaggerated, that even Mao noted the benefits of Japanese colonization. Suisheng Zhao (2004, 2005) sees the issue as an important piece of “pragmatic” state nationalism which can essentially be switched on or off whenever the CCP feels the need to shore up its domestic support. Gries (2005, 2007) agrees that the issue is used to the CCP’s advantage, yet sees a more genuinely popular movement based on indignation and a new “victim narrative” resulting from China’s “century of humiliation”. An earlier work, Strecker Downs (1998-1999) portrays the CCP as having created a youth force akin to the “Red Guards” of the Cultural Revolution, which the authors doubt can be effectively constrained. Reilly’s (2006) piece on “history activism” finds value in all positions and is thus valuable and troublesome as a non-partisan review of the most important issues.

The closest to consensus on a topic which the scholars come is on the fact that, while the roots of the sentiment lie in history, the complete and pragmatic control over history, education, and the media by The Party is responsible for the rising Anti-Japanese tides. The only real alternative to this causal story is presented by Jian Yang (2007), drawing attention to a prominent IR scholar in China whose minority opinion is gaining wider acceptance by placing Sino-Japanese relations in a broader context of world development: China’s conflict with Japan is not based on history but instead results from Japan’s alliance with the USA with the intention of “containing” China—read by Chinese as joining forces to prevent China from becoming a stronger country.

No previous study has gathered a sufficient amount of empirical data on the opinions of Chinese college students on specific issues of Sino-Japanese relations. The commendable empirical work by Yu and Zhao (2006) on Anti-US protests, while valuable for showing that such research is possible, appears somewhat misdirected in light of the greater anti-Japanese history and larger scale of the 2005 protests. Still, measuring anti-Japanese sentiment--let alone nationalism itself--by symptomatic effects such as participation in protests, while moving, is perilously imprecise. While such sentiment is clearly prevalent, these studies neglect the approximately 50% or more of the population which hold more moderate views on Japan, yet may still be highly nationalistic.

The international surveys are as useful as a presidential straw poll, allowing only a snapshot of opinions while neglecting the possibly more interesting relationships between anti-Japanese sentiment and demographic variables such as geographic location and whether one's hometown was formerly colonized, knowledge of Japan, use of the internet, and a variety of others which are likely to influence one's opinion. Inaccessibility and unreliability of surveys conducted by Chinese groups confound their greater cultural access by unclear and likely unscrupulous methods, possibly designed with the intention of justifying or proving an agenda, most likely the "official" one. The salience of this issue is also taken for granted by all of these studies--no attempt has been made to measure the level of interest among the population; rather, Chinese citizens who may never have thought much of the issue are forced to take strong positions which may reflect the effect of being surveyed rather than their real indifference. Finally, little data exists on any matter of public opinion in the less-developed Western regions, despite the province of Sichuan being China's most populous and home to 10% of the entire world's population.

#### **PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:**

It must be repeated, for vulnerability to critiques of lacking focus and having too many research questions, that the primary objective of this exploratory project is to gather empirical data which will diversify and consolidate the ways in which anti-Japanese sentiment in China is measured. It will seek to establish correlations between the dependent variable, anti-Japanese sentiment, which is assumed to vary over time, and independent, demographic variables which are assumed to be constant or at least more stable. These relationships are also likely to be more stable than the overall measure of the dependent variable over time, and thus, this study will be of far greater value than the unsophisticated, cross-sectional opinion polls which have been administered previously. Relationships highlighted by this study will allow the generalization across demographic groups in China with respect to the expected level of anti-Japanese sentiment held by its members, which in the current era is considered a major component of national identity for PRC citizens.

In addition to the primary question, this project seeks to use its data pool to shed greater light on the scholarly controversies surrounding the issue. Explicitly, the observations will seek to answer the questions listed through the conclusion of this section. 1. Will the justifications for anti-Japanese opinions and action be based on a “victim narrative” given as an “objective” account of history? 2. Is the widespread anti-Japanese sentiment a result of popular or official nationalism? 3. Is it an instrument of the government (to achieve what goal)? Does it provide legitimacy, and does the government encourage or merely tolerate its expression for fear of reprisal from the population? 4. Have the government and media created an anti-Japanese monster which may be running out of their control? 5. Is the general population satisfied with the government’s attitude and policies toward Japan?

Question number 6 is admittedly more tangential, attempting to measure minority support for the regime and ethnic identity, both of which are almost impossible to measure directly without jeopardizing the safety of interviewers and interviewees. 6. Will minorities living in the PRC express less virulent anti-Japanese sentiment, thereby suggesting a lesser identity of the self as Chinese, or will they tend to be hyper-anti-Japanese to compensate for their somewhat second-class status and to prove themselves as in solidarity with the Han majority and Asians in general?

Questions which will be answered directly from our survey data are: 7. What makes Chinese youth more likely to be anti-Japanese? 8. What is the level of anti-Japanese sentiment in the PRC compared to Chinese in other nations and among non-Chinese people?

## **METHODOLOGY:**

Given the potential scale and other challenges of assessing public opinion in the largest-N state in the world, it is necessary to state the methods of research for this study in a more tentative matter, allowing for inevitable differences in what ideal research integrity, budgetary allowances, and local cooperation will permit. An ideal treatment of the matter would cover the opinions of ethnic Chinese in every nation, on a single day, gather a representative and random sample of the entire population of every province of China, and it would involve no fear on the part of subjects in revealing one’s true feelings.

As is always the case, the research ideal must cope practically with the realistic incongruities presented by the given environment. It is both reasonable and still highly beneficial to general knowledge to approach the problem of gauging Chinese youths’ perception of Japan in the terms and situations outlined in this following section.

**Preliminary Summary of Methods.** This study will use a three-tiered, multi-method approach to assess the levels of anti-Japanese sentiment among various demographic groups in the Peoples Republic of China, focusing on different

types of college students. The three methods employed will be: 1. Content analysis of Chinese student web logs or “blogs”. 2. Mass survey given to college students in classrooms and on campus interviews. 3. Small focus groups consisting of Chinese students and a Japanese foreign exchange student. The first method will be employed in the USA, and the latter two will require personal interaction with Chinese citizens in the PRC.

These three methods will provide a variety of both quantitative and qualitative data, from which causative hypotheses about the relationship between anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese youth can be drawn, and which will test the plausibility of relationships posited by the scholarly literature. The following sections provide a detailed outline of how these three methods will be administered. These are followed by responses to methodological and theoretical concerns raised by the proposal thus far.

**1. Content Analysis.** With respect to blogs and online forums, terms which will be used interchangeably here, content analysis is a method which has yet to embrace the opportunities opened by technology in a systematic manner extending beyond anecdotes. Intended here as a more exploratory first step to influence the examination of topics covered in the second and third methods employed by this study, the manner in which the content of blogs is analyzed will not go into great depth or complexity, nor will any grand conclusions be drawn. A cursory search of Chinese internet sites yields a growing number student blog sites affiliated with most major news and social networking web companies, and with a much wider variety of topics than one would expect in a tightly controlled propaganda state. A very basic method of testing the attitudes toward Japanese-related issues among Chinese college students will be to select a blog site--this study will use the People's Daily online forum, as a previous study (*Renmin Ribao*, 2005) has done and translated a similar study--and count the number of entries in which “Japan” appears in the title. These titles can be coded as either positive, neutral, or negative toward Japan and plotted in a simple histogram showing frequency distribution of the three ratings. This relatively simple descriptive statistic will give a preliminary idea of whether past opinion surveys of the Chinese population are in line with youth who use the internet, assumed by several articles to be the most strongly nationalistic and anti-Japanese. Salience of the issue can also be measured by calculating the proportion of entries mentioning Japan as a decimal fraction of all entries, across several sites. This would also help to establish which sites are most frequented by “angry young men”, perhaps for a future study focused solely on the opinions of China's cyber-nationalists.

**2. Mass Surveys.** A two-sided survey will be given to students soliciting their opinions on issues of Sino-Japanese relations and of Japan in general. The tentative survey questions can be found in both English and Chinese in APPENDIX A. Obviously, the English version is only for reference and use for non-Chinese students in the USA to establish a baseline for

comparison. In the PRC, the questions will be given in the official written language of simplified Chinese. The actual survey forms may change drastically due to new information obtained from the content analysis of student blogs, theoretical or practical methodological concerns.

There is likely to be some multicollinearity of independent (demographic) variables listed on the survey. Two examples which we anticipate and therefore can compensate for are the likely relationships between having high or low income and living in the East or West of the PRC, and the likely relationship between household income and use of the internet. Compensation techniques for the first problem, if for example our sample did not yield enough poor residence in Jiangsu (the PRC's most affluent province), a booster sample could be taken at a college in a poorer city of Jiangsu. Personal experience leads the primary researcher to believe that there will not be difficulty, given the large sample size across all regions of the country, in accumulating enough examples of poor internet addicts and rich students who rarely go online to run regressions isolating a single independent variable's relationship with the dependent variable. It is unfortunately impossible disentangle the multicollinearity of East Coast provinces and the effects of Japanese colonialism.

PART ONE of the survey is intended to gain a clearer picture of the Sino-centric world order. As pertains specifically to this study, notes will be taken as to the percentage of students who place Japan in either the top or bottom five rankings for benevolent world influence, as China's "best friend" or "worst enemy". A measure of Sinocentric nationalism may be taken in noting whether China is ranked as having the best influence on the world and whether China's "best friend" is also ranked #1 (or #2 after China) as the best influence on the world. This more open-ended angle of investigation leaves the door open to the possibility that Japan may not be the sole or even most important target as "the other" of Chinese nationalism.

The wording of the survey questions will be meticulously arranged so as to prevent unthinking responses from being coded as valid. A likely example which may confound results would be a student whose level of interest is so low, or who is in such a hurry to leave the classroom, that all questions would be answered exactly the same way, creating artificial and likely extreme results. The tentative format encourages these kind of students to either read the questions carefully and consider one's response, or to enter a response of neutrality or indifference. Surveys showing uniformity of answers which result in extreme, internally conflicting positions on Sino-Japanese issues may be discarded or entered into the database as "indifferent/uninterested".

The primary means by which we will measure students' overall perception of Japan will be PART TWO of the survey, in which statements related to Japan will be graded on a -3 to +3 scale of strong disagreement to strong

agreement. Again, different wording of the statements will solicit both agreements and disagreements of differing degrees in students with a negative view of Japan, for the reason given above. Each statement will be given a positive or negative value as either pro- or anti-Japan and scored according to each student's level of (dis-)agreement. Scores for individual statements will be added together to form a cumulative score, either positive (pro-Japan) or negative (anti-Japan), which we will refer to as that student's "Japanese Perception Index" or JPI. The wide scale of -3 to +3, rather than a simple, dichotomous agree/disagree choice, will maximize the experimental variance of the dependent variable and ensure the impossibility of an extremely pro-Japanese student--and the international opinion surveys show that there are at least a few in existence--and an extremely anti-Japanese student tallying the same JPI. In total, we expect the survey portion of the study to last between 10-25 minutes for an interested participant.

As should be evident, our investigation is sacrificing parsimony which we believe has led to a superficial understanding, for greater depth and more complexity than some would prefer. Those who believe the results of previous surveys, both domestic and conducted by international research groups, to be adequate will be pleased to know that the same questions used to solicit all known survey results on the issue will be repeated for this study. As we will be sampling in different areas, and the effects of being asked many more questions on these opinion polls is unknown, however, the comparability of our results will be far from seamless. In short, attempts have been made to conform our methods to previous studies, but to use our results to extend previous data sets longitudinally would be a calculated risk of dubious scholarly integrity.

**Survey Sampling Details.** To compensate for non-random sampling, a very large number of surveys will be given, with the target total exceeding 2,500. The larger number of survey participants will also allow for sampled populations of various groups, especially marginalized groups as ethnic minorities and the poor and rural, to be boosted without taking artificial measures which obviously "single them out". 300 surveys will be given to students in each selected province, and within each province the majority of surveys will be done in the provincial capital, where the majority of universities are. A quota of 50 surveys will be taken at a college outside the capital--from a distance at least great enough not to be considered suburban--to increase the diversity of the sampled students' calibers and minimize the possible skewing effects of differences between colleges in and outside the capital cities. Sampling outside the capital city at this ratio will also represent the student populations of the provinces more accurately.

Unconventional selection and interview methods are inevitable in this case, as even the largest-scale and professional work done to date (Yu and Zhao, 2006) used non-random "snowball" methods to recruit participants. The tentative plan for this project is to gain permission from college professors to have the surveys administered in their

classrooms. The advantages and disadvantages of this method are discussed below.

Additional baseline samples of approximately 50 each will be drawn from college students in the USA, both of Chinese students studying here and American students not of Chinese descent. A sampling of Japanese exchange students will also be sought, but is not essential to the study. Comparing the JPI's of Chinese students here will assess the effects on Japanese perception of studying in the USA, or at least of being a wealthy, elite student with great English skills. One would expect the opinions of American students to be less strong in both directions, with many more neutral and indifferent responses, so the salience of the issue in the PRC student population could be tested. Comparing the JPI's of PRC and Japanese students would provide a convenient test of the internal validity of the survey in measuring perceptions of Japan. Each of these baseline comparisons could be done before finalizing the questionnaire, and before beginning research in China.

**3. Focus Groups.** The frequent use of focus groups for marketing purposes has contributed to a negative opinion toward their use in more scholarly research, however they are vitally useful as a means of supporting large-N quantitative data with a convincing narrative of the stories behind the numbers. Especially given the issues of collective action in mass movements, focus groups may be the best way to observe how peer relationships affect one's own opinion, how conflicts can divide otherwise cohesive movements, and conversely how modest beginnings based on shared agendas can serve as foundations for earth-shaking change. The format of the focus groups in this study, as outlined tentatively in APPENDIX B, will allow a group of students to convene for one hour in a cordial, safe environment to discuss the issues affecting current Sino-Japanese relations. It is hoped that new issues will be raised, and lively debate can be sustained. For many of the students, it will be the first time they have met and spoken with a Japanese person, and also possibly the first time they have had to articulate their own political beliefs or had them challenged. These focus groups will also put the scholars writing on this topic to a likely harsh trial by youthful fire in terms of the plausibility of their theses, to note whether they are conscious of being the subjects of so much media attention, of being part of a national movement.

**Primary Research Location.** The first stage of in-country research will take place in the "primary research location" (PRL), which will serve as the project headquarters. To maximize efficiency and minimize costs, this location is likely to be in a city where the primary researcher has already established connections, and permission to conduct research has been given well in advance. Flexible candidates for the PRL include Zhangye or Lanzhou, Gansu, or Chengdu, Sichuan. At this PRL a greater sampling of the population will be taken to serve as a baseline for comparison across demographic groups. Other locations will survey only college students, but at the PRL groups having different levels of education, and being composed of those not in the 八零后 *ba ling hou* (post-1980) generation will be sampled. Approximately 100 participants

will be given the same survey as college students in the other locations, to assess whether the dependent variable varies among demographics not tested elsewhere. At this PRL a representative sampling is most crucial, so randomizing measures will be taken. As there is no phone book in most Chinese cities, and street addresses are used only occasionally, the challenge of creating a random sample of even two additional and narrowly targeted demographic groups is acute. It is highly unlikely that the local government will turn over residency lists to a foreign researcher, so it will be essential that at least two members of the research team are also local, well-connected residents of the PRL. Street interviews in a public location are an undesirable last resort, which would require the use of a larger team of interviewers in order to meet quotas within the limited time frame available.

**Secondary Locations.** In addition to the PRL, the proposed project will dispense surveys to college students in the following provinces: Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, and Shaanxi. Following the surveys, students will be recruited on their campuses to participate in focus groups of approximately 10 persons, with 1-2 of the participants in the group being Japanese. All surveys and focus groups will be conducted over a one-month period in the summer of 2008, concluding before the Olympic summer games in Beijing.

In all locations focus groups of eight to ten individuals, selected on the basis of an even gender distribution, interest following the survey portion, and following a universal format (See APPENDIX B), will be conducted on the campus where the students attend classes. Depending on funding, the proceedings of the focus groups will be recorded on cassette tape or digital video, and the content will be transcribed into written form and translated into English by the Chinese members of the research team. One focus group will be conducted in each province where surveys are given, for a total of eight different transcripts.

**Why college students?** It is clear that no exploratory research need be done to show which age groups are most likely to harbor strong nationalist sentiment. The scholarly literature has focused on college student protests, and believing this focus to be largely justified, continuing it will allow this study to relate more comparably with past research. Students are considered to be the future, and the measure of their extremes in activism or apathy may provide insights into the future of the country. College students are also the most practically convenient group to study, as they are highly predictable in terms of congregation, PRC colleges are more "open" than the rest of society, and college students have far more spare time than in lower levels of education. A greater general level of education also makes college students the most logical group to ask questions of international interest and requiring some worldly consciousness.

Focusing primarily on college students is not without its drawbacks. High school students have also been known to have strongly emotional opinions, and other age groups are also worthy of study. The one-child policy having taken



strong effect for this generation also means that they will not constitute as great a proportion of the general Chinese population, and thus our results will be somewhat less generalizable to it.

**Are college students still Chinese “youth”?** While there is no nation-wide law, it has been noted as part of the CCP's attempt to restrict population growth that Chinese citizens are strongly discouraged from marrying or having children before the age of 20, or indeed before graduating from college, lest amorous pursuits distract one from the primary goal of self-improvement.

Despite the upheavals and attacks on traditional culture in the 1970's Cultural Revolution, Chinese society's profound reverence for elders leads to the use of the same terms, 小伙子 *Xiao huozǐ* and 姑娘 *gu niang*, in reference to young men and women from approximately adolescence until well into one's 20's. As mentioned in the introduction, those of this age are considered the “new” generation, born after Mao died and drastic reforms of the economy and education, as well as the “one-child policy”, were implemented. They have been noted as being at once more confident, self-centered, opinionated, and nationalistic than previous generations exposed personally to the often tragic and humiliating turbulence of civil wars and self-imposed Maoist fiascos.

**Why these locations?** The provinces and other areas have been selected for geographic representation, intense history or lack of history in relating to Japan (see maps, APPENDIX F), as well as practical matters such as accessibility. It is an unfortunate fact that research of any kind which is known to be conducted by a foreigner will not be permitted by officials in sensitive areas containing large minority populations, and indeed the costs of doing research in the major urban centers of Beijing and Shanghai would be all but prohibitive, to the ultimate detriment of representing the Chinese population as a whole. Indeed, the only Chinese people who believe that these cities represent the Chinese population are those who live in them and have never left them. The goal of this project is not to assess the opinions of Chinese elites (those who attend colleges in Beijing and Shanghai), nor its downtrodden rural masses, but rather to bring to light the reasoning which has driven so many young and moderately well-educated Chinese to the streets in protest.

The provinces selected as secondary research locations (see map in APPENDIX F) represent distinct geographic regions of China, which also have differing historical relationships with Japan. At least two selected provinces in each region overlap with another region. The East, represented by Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, has naturally had the most direct contact with the Japanese and is also known to be the most affluent section of the country. The West, representing the traditional frontier of Chinese civilization before the annexation of East Turkestan and Tibet, forms three contiguous provinces on the eastern edge of the Himalayas and Tibetan Plateau in Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. These western provinces are still generally thought of as economically backward, despite a massive “Develop the West”

campaign dating back to the golden years of Maoism. Shaanxi and Guangxi are added to complete groups of three in the north and south, respectively.

**Why surveys and focus groups?** Past studies have used both surveys and individual interviews, though often only in isolation, to assess both opinions of Japan and motivations for participation in protests. The group dynamics of a focus group are more appropriate in that they simulate the peer interactions which have been shown to be highly influential in shaping one's personal opinion on these issues, especially for spontaneous protests. Focus groups provide powerful support--or important questions about validity--for mass surveys, in that they give concrete, individualized examples of the phenomenon under scrutiny and help immensely to form qualitative narratives which are essential for sustaining interest in publications.

**What if your research group is assigned an official or covert CCP liaison who insists on or forces changes in your research design or content?** Nicholas D. Kristof's book, *China Wakes* (1995), contains many anecdotes about evading his assigned shadow while visiting sensitive sources as a reporter for the *New York Times*. While our work will not be nearly as high-profile, it can be assumed that the sophistication of surveillance techniques and technology have advanced significantly since the time that book was written, and we should not assume that we are not being very closely monitored at all times. As we would ever be at the mercy of the collegiate, local, provincial, and national authorities, the most practical coping mechanism is clearly to give in to their demands where they do not seriously compromise our research, and when they do, to judge how dangerous it would be to agree to and then ignore their changes.

**How will individual denials of access to students be handled?** Flexibility is supremely important in all endeavors undertaken outside of one's home country, and perhaps especially in developing countries. It is estimated anecdotally that 95% of plans made in China more than a day or two in advance will change, often fundamentally. Our research plan is flexible to the extent that even if an entire provincial capital's colleges denied us access, we would be comfortable substituting a nearby province for that proposed in the secondary locations section. The same principal applies on a smaller scale to "gatekeepers" individual schools. Each provincial capital has enough colleges to make it likely that at least one will grant us "admission", and there are enough other cities outside the capital with colleges for easy substitution. We prefer to see the positives in this effect as increasing the randomization of our sampling technique, as there is no apparent logic behind which policies are enforced and which are ignored.

**What if all authorities deny permission to undertake this study?** Total denial at a provincial level was covered in the previous paragraph. If access denial becomes a pervasive or total impediment to our research, or if a national authority threatens to deport or revoke the visa of the primary investigator, there is likely little conventional recourse

available to “win over” such a gatekeeper. This project will not be conducted in a covert, “fly-by-night” manner, as such would compromise the quality of the data and employability of the preferred methods, not to mention endangering the safety of all those involved. It is hoped that the government would appreciate an accurate measure of anti-Japanese sentiment among its students being taken, given the great threat to national economic and political stability its spontaneous expression presents. In short, we do not anticipate a blanket policy of denied access, or we would not have proposed such a project as this. The official countermeasure to circumvent CCP red tape has been, “if at first you don’t succeed, wait until someone else’s shift and ask again,” paired with an innocent, cooperative demeanor and flattery of the empowered individual(s) and the treasure that is Chinese culture.

**What if authorities declare this study illegal after it has already begun?** The propensity for officials to change their minds and rescind permissions--or suddenly enforce official policies--cannot be solely attributed to individual indecision or misalignment of heavenly bodies but rather most often the official words from higher-ups recently informed of situations for which they may actually be held accountable. A judgment call will be made on a case-by-case basis as to whether to press on at the same location until quotas are met or to relocate to greener data pastures with shorter fences. Further gate keeping issues are discussed in the HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS section of this proposal.

**If the sampling isn’t random, how can accurate generalizations be made from your results?** Once the sample size reaches a critical threshold for a population, widely accepted as around 1000 for even entire national populations, the effects of non-random sampling become negligible. No known survey not conducted by an international research agency has reached this size or variance in their samples, yet generalizations are nonetheless drawn from them.

**How will surveying in the college classrooms affect your results? Is such a method realistic?** The primary advantage of classroom surveys, whether the college sophomores are American or Chinese, is the ability to collect large amounts of data at once, thus avoiding the great resource expenditures of individual interviews. The problem of “clumped” or unintentionally clustered samples, based on the assumption that students in a single class are likely to share many characteristics which may significantly affect the dependent variable, is also mitigated if not eliminated by the large sample size. The tendency for Chinese students to talk to and “help” each other on exams given in classrooms may affect results, especially on the “knowledge of Japan” section of the survey, however it is highly unlikely that such effects will be pervasive and present at each site.

As to whether this method can be employed in China, the primary researcher has secured permission to survey in classes from teachers known personally, and the use of research team members familiar with the institutions in other locations is expected to provide sufficient access. We expect, as in the Yu and Zhao study (2006), a response rate near

100% with this method, given the general interest among Chinese students--often answering that their favorite thing to do with free time is sleep--to participate in activities outside their usual routines, and the relative cultural unfamiliarity with and disapproval of "opting out" of group activities.

**What is the purpose of asking demographic questions 14 & 15 (APPENDIX A)?** The rice VS. noodles question (14) has been used in the primary researcher's own surveys to create controversy and excitement in the EFL classroom without getting anyone in trouble--asking about democracy was probably risky, in retrospect. This is a question almost certain to vary regionally--noodles in the north and rice in the south--and so can be used to compare against the regional variation in the dependent variable.

The even or odd birthday question (15) is a 100% random test for the appropriateness of the sample size. As there is absolutely no reason why a student's response to this question would affect his or her JPI, the number of even and odd students with a given JPI value would be expected to approach a perfect 1:1 ratio as N approaches infinity. If the results of JPI testing show a very strong relationship with birthdays, it will suggest that something anomalous has happened in the sample, or that it was not nearly large enough.

**Why during Summer, 2008?** It is presumed that, in the time leading up to the Olympics, there will be an upsurge in national pride, an opportune moment to assess a topic which has played no small part in Chinese nationalism. Students who study a greater distance from their hometowns are more likely to return to their home provinces in the summer, thus those who enroll in the summer terms are more likely to be from the province where the data is collected, lessening slightly the need to re-sort the data by province after it is collected.

**How will data be analyzed?** Students' JPI's, attained from PART TWO of the survey (APPENDIX A) will be the primary unit used to assess Chinese college students' opinions of Japan. Parts of the survey will be compared with each other for consistency, i.e. to confirm that there are no strongly negative JPI's whose answers to part five indicate a positive opinion of Japan. Once entered into a database by researchers, the independent variables' relationships to the JPI will be examined in bivariate and multi-variate statistical regressions, conducted by the primary researcher, having received training in such techniques from graduate-level classes at Marquette University. The regressions will be done in coordination with peers and faculty at the university who have a great deal of experience in more complex statistical analysis techniques.

A qualitative analysis and summary of the nine focus group transcripts will yield a narrative of multiple perspectives, allowing for a better grasp of the causal forces at play in shaping them. Direct comparison of student perspectives and the scholarly literature will be possible, and the depth and sincerity of the sentiment which ostensibly

caused the 2005 protests will be much better understood. Together, these quantitative and qualitative results will provide the basis for publications in scholarly journals, with the possibility of synthesizing conference presentations on the primary topic and on research in China in general.

**What conclusions will be drawn?** The preceding section assumes, of course, that there will be a compelling story to share, told by the data which is collected. A complete lack of variance in the extent of and reasoning behind anti-Japanese sentiment in China, as given by our data, would have to be taken as a major failure in research design. No country of China's size or otherwise can be completely monolithic. Depending on which demographic variables are shown to covary with high or low anti-Japanese sentiment, different conclusions will be possible. For example, we expect that Eastern areas of the country will be more positively correlated with anti-Japanese sentiment than other areas, but also a prevalent sense of this in all areas. The extent to which such a difference exists can serve as an indicator of national unity in general and either challenge or justify past sampling techniques by other surveys.

#### **TIMELINE:**

Spring 2008: Having secured funding, assemble Mainland research team via e-mail correspondence.

May 20<sup>th</sup>-31<sup>st</sup>: Conduct content analysis of Chinese college student blogs on the internet. Revise survey questionnaire and focus group questions. Administer revised survey to Chinese and American students at Marquette.

June 1<sup>st</sup>- 7<sup>th</sup>: Arrive in Hong Kong to secure necessary visa. Cross into Mainland at earliest convenience. Meet with Chinese research team leader to finalize roster of research team.

June 7<sup>th</sup> - 15<sup>th</sup>: Meet with Chinese research team to train members on survey and focus group administration procedures. Conduct initial round of surveys and focus group at "primary research location".

June 15<sup>th</sup> - July 15<sup>th</sup>: Conduct surveys and focus groups at secondary locations. Enter survey data into spreadsheets, transcribe and translate focus group content into English.

July 16<sup>th</sup> - August 31<sup>st</sup>: Return to USA to analyze data and publish conclusions.

**Temporal Challenges.** The potential for exogenous events, such as news stories or high-profile meetings between China and Japan, to influence the dependent variable over the extended period in which data are collected is unfortunately and unavoidably greater than negligible. All team members will be responsible for monitoring the Chinese media for such events, and the team leader will be responsible for creating a summary of all major events occurring in Sino-Japanese relations for the entire summer. Conducting all research on the same day, or even within the same week,

would require an exorbitant increase of resources, and the concomitant rise in the profile of the study would be detrimental to the confidentiality of the participants, the discretionary-but not covert-nature of data gathering techniques, securing permission from gatekeepers, and ultimately the validity of the results due to a much-inflated Hawthorne effect at each location.

## THE RESEARCHERS:

Over the course of three visits to the Peoples Republic of China, the primary researcher, Julian Lee (see APPENDIX D), has taken all of the steps considered necessary by the local population to become a 中国通 (*Zhongguo Tong* or “old China hand”) with the exception of three: 1. Still has developed no taste for tea; 2. Does not drink or smoke; 3. Does not enjoy spicy food. Through nearly three years living in the country Julian has accumulated the essential 关系 *guanxi* (connections and relationships) needed to conduct business of any sort in the PRC. On the human resources aspect of *guanxi* this includes local Chinese acquaintances and foreign English teachers in several provinces, as well as access to a very deep pool of unemployed Chinese college graduates eager to gain work experience and 关系 *guanxi* with foreigners. In terms of skills and material resources, the primary researcher is fully able to function within Chinese society—including communication, bargaining, travel, and other practical matters. He has experience in hiring Chinese students as personal assistants and in conducting informal surveys in a classroom setting.

While Tong Lam's article (Jensen, 2007) on public opinion research in China mentions a pair of formal research groups whose services may be procured on a contract basis, the sensitive nature of the material and cost concerns lead to a preference by the primary researcher to assemble a competent team from personal contacts who are already trusted and who can be counted on to adhere to the specific methods as outlined in previous sections. Faced with the inevitable and unpredictable nature of obstacles in the PRC, the team will be comprised of educated individuals who have attended or currently attend the schools where the research is conducted, whenever possible. This will allow for greater access to the target populations, greater flexibility and innovation in dealing with setbacks, and greater confidence in the results.

The local (Chinese) team will consist of one leader who will serve as an assistant to the primary researcher and assume the responsibilities of coordinating the other members of the team: arranging travel, coordinating dates and reports, and other non-research administrative tasks. Each province of interest will be represented by one team member; thus the total number of paid research team members will be nine, not including the primary researcher. Either the primary researcher or the team leader will be present at the secondary locations when the focus groups are undertaken.

Each team member will be responsible for meeting the survey sample quota for his/her province, following the administrative procedures outlined above. S/he will also act as the moderator in the focus group. Data entry of the survey results will be delegated to unpaid volunteers at the primary research location, unless volunteers are unavailable, in which case a small wage will be paid to data entrants.

The ninth participant in focus groups will be a Chinese-speaking Japanese student, preferably attending the same college as the Chinese students. Thus, focus groups will primarily be arranged at colleges with a Japanese foreign exchange population from which to draw a willing participant. If this is not possible at a given location, travel expenses will be furnished for a Japanese participant from another location to take part in an additional group. Given the sensitivity of the issue, noting that careless Japanese foreign exchange students in Xi'an nearly sparked anti-Japanese protests single-handedly with a risqué short play as noted by He (2007), it will be necessary to screen participants carefully. A balance will be sought between the ability to challenge the predominant opinion, representing a Japanese perspective, and the caution needed so not to be offensive to the local students.

#### **HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS STATEMENT:**

As has been noted throughout this proposal, the PRC presents a unique challenge to the researcher to strike a balance between research questions which are of scholarly interest and those which are "safe" to ask Chinese citizens. Standards for question "safety" are clearly not uniform and can depend on one's location in the PRC--Tibet and Xinjiang are almost certainly off limits for any questioning or Western research including journalism--and one's identity. Asking minority groups a lot of questions on any topic--even one's favorite color may have a "right" and "wrong" answer--is likely to raise suspicion among state and local authorities as to the nature of one's investigation.

No matter whom one asks in the PRC, it is my assessment as the primary researcher that the country is not ready to undertake unrestrained research into the critical and often-conducted inquiry of regime support among the population. Tong Lam's (Jensen, 2007) otherwise optimistic piece cites a domestic 2003 survey attempting to measure precisely this which was summarily curtailed by an embarrassed Party and never reported or retried. One shudders to think whether everyone who participated in that study is now on a special government list.

This project intentionally avoids subject material which relates directly to the CCP or which may implicate either interviewers or interviewees. The vagaries of PRC officials cannot be 100% accounted for in what they will allow and not, nor even what they may one day decide to use against the participants in this study. While every attempt has been made to keep the safety and security of those involved in this study as a fundamental concern, total confidentiality of

responses cannot be guaranteed.

It is possible that there may be a law prohibiting the right to assembly in the PRC which may be applied broadly to our intention to conduct focus groups. We would comply, reluctantly, with such attempts at enforcement and in the interests of preserving safety would have little choice but to drop the focus groups from our research design in favor of less conspicuous individual interviews.

As mentioned earlier, previous work done in the PRC provides conflicting evidence of what is considered dangerous by either the government or the Chinese people. Examples of “muckraking” by Western journalists abound, though their means of obtaining information have undoubtedly not always been safe or approved by Chinese authorities. Past studies on precisely our topic have been conducted, though the results have not always been made available to the public, and the potential for the Western nature of the scholarship to restrict access is admittedly an issue. What can be guaranteed is that every attempt will be made to maintain the anonymity of our research sources, and if there are any indications of conflict with the authorities in a particular location, we will make adjustments in our model accordingly.

#### **BEYOND THIS PROJECT:**

Without excessive difficulty, this research project could be replicated for longitudinal studies conducted at later dates, and also used as a standard measurement of opinions toward Japan in other countries. As the leading economic power in the region, there is no shortage of nations whose populations hold strong and largely negative views of Japan, regarding both its role in WWII and its ongoing domestic and international treatment of its legacy. The methods and materials used to study Chinese feelings toward Japan could be applied to other countries with only minor adjustments to survey questions tailored to address current issues between Japan and the new population in question. More directly related to the results of this study, a complementary assessment of Japanese opinions of China could also be undertaken, though likely with major methodological and content-related changes given the smaller geographic area to be covered, higher monetary costs, but also presumably greater ease in securing official permissions and individual honesty of opinions.

Regardless of the results of this study adhering precisely to the details as stipulated, this project would be invaluable as an indicator of what kind of research topics and methods will be allowed by the local and national authorities. One of the most salient issues in the PRC today, noticed by even the most itinerant tourist, is the regional and even interpersonal variance of policies in general, and especially toward foreigners. With a detailed log of the progress and challenges faced in this study, a practical contribution to guiding future research in China could be compiled and



shared in a corollary publication.

## **CONCLUSION:**

The challenges of doing research in China are not valid excuses for the current lack of depth in understanding of fundamental characteristics of the population in this rising world power, already awarded the 21<sup>st</sup> century by many onlookers before it is even a decade old. Conventional wisdom on the subject of mass anti-Japanese sentiment in China currently rests on assumptions based on anecdotal evidence, differing accounts in agenda-burdened media, and a non-transparent regime which has been assessed in terms of power and legitimacy as being variously challenged to on the verge of collapse throughout the course of its existence. This study as proposed stands a realistic chance of shedding light on what could be one of the major, even defining international relationships of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and the window of opportunity for studying it could close unpredictably in any number of ways. China's recent history is one of brief openings and sudden, harsh contractions of inquiry and dialog from without and within its own population. The architects behind this proposal are prepared to face these challenges head-on in an attempt to expand both the depth and breadth of knowledge in this critical area.

## APPENDIX A: TENTATIVE SURVEY FORMS, PAGE ONE, ENGLISH VERSION (FRONT SIDE/QUESTIONS)

Thank you for your cooperation in sharing your thoughts with regards to the following questions for a study of public opinion. All of your answers will remain anonymous, so please give your honest, personal opinion. If you have *no opinion at all* on a question because you are not interested in it, please place an "X" in the blank next to "DON'T CARE/NOT INTERESTED". If you don't know what your opinion is because you are neutral or ambivalent, place an "X" in the blank next to "NEUTRAL". You are strongly encouraged to express your opinion! None of us are experts, but we may influence those who are!

**PART ONE: INTERNATIONAL RANKINGS. PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF THEIR OVERALL INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD. 1= BEST INFLUENCE, 2= SECOND-BEST INFLUENCE...24= SECOND-WORST INFLUENCE, 25= WORST INFLUENCE. YOU NEED NOT ENTER A NUMBER FOR EVERY COUNTRY. WE ARE MOST INTERESTED IN #1-5 AND #20-25. FOR THE LAST TWO QUESTIONS, PLEASE WRITE THE NAME OF A COUNTRY (NEED NOT BE ONE OF THE 25).**

\_\_Australia \_\_Brazil \_\_Canada \_\_China \_\_Colombia \_\_Cuba \_\_France \_\_Germany \_\_India \_\_Indonesia \_\_Iran  
 \_\_Israel \_\_Japan \_\_Mexico \_\_Pakistan \_\_Russia \_\_Saudi Arabia \_\_South Africa \_\_Sudan \_\_Turkey \_\_UK  
 (Great Britain) \_\_USA \_\_Venezuela  
 \_\_\_\_\_ DON'T CARE/NOT INTERESTED \_\_\_\_\_ NEUTRAL

WHICH COUNTRY DO YOU THINK IS CHINA'S "BEST FRIEND" IN THE WORLD? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ DON'T CARE/NOT INTERESTED \_\_\_\_\_ NEUTRAL

WHICH COUNTRY DO YOU THINK IS CHINA'S "WORST ENEMY" IN THE WORLD? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ DON'T CARE/NOT INTERESTED \_\_\_\_\_ NEUTRAL

**PART TWO: OPINIONS OF JAPAN. PLEASE FILL IN THE BOX BELOW THE POSITION WHICH BEST ESTIMATES YOUR OWN ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neutral	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Japanese people are friendly.							
2. Japan has apologized to China enough for its actions in WWII.							
3. Japan's overall influence on China has been bad.							
4. Japan is trying to help Asia.							
5. Japan has built a lighthouse on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The islands belong to Japan.							
6. China should be more grateful towards Japan for investing in China.							
7. If there were an Anti-Japanese protest here, I would participate in it.							
8. If there were an Anti-Japanese protest here, I would not participate in it, even if my friends wanted me to join.							
9. Japan makes very good products.							
10. I would not buy a Japanese product, even if I could afford one, and its quality was the best available.							
11. Junichiro Koizumi should not have visited the Yasukuni Shrine and should not in the future.							
12. Japan should be allowed into the UN Security Council							
13. School textbooks in Japan whitewash their WWII atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre.							
14. China has actually won every war it has fought against Japan.							
15. Chinese people should try very hard to make friends with Japanese.							
16. The sooner the Chinese economy surpasses Japan, the better.							
17. I would never marry a Japanese person.							
18. Japanese people should have to pay an extra tax to enter China.							
19. Japan should not be allowed to build offensive military capabilities because it will behave aggressively again.							
20. When Japan is condescending to China, it is like disrespecting one's grandfather.							
21. Products made in China are not as good as products made in Japan.							
22. If China and Japan went to war today, China would win.							
23. China and Japan are enemies.							
24. Japanese food tastes worse than Western food.							
25. It is OK for China to call Japan "xiao ri ben" (Little Japan)							

**APPENDIX A (cont.): TENTATIVE SURVEY FORMS, PAGE TWO, ENGLISH VERSION (BACK SIDE/DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION)**

Part 3: Demographics. Please place your answer or an "X" in the blank next to the characteristic which best describes you or your household. Again, all responses will be kept confidential.

1. Sex: ☐ Male ☐ Female    2. Age: ☐ Below 17 ☐ 17-23 ☐ Above 23    3. In which province is your home? \_\_\_\_\_
4. Population of Hometown: ☐ Less than 10,000  
☐ 10,000-100,000 ☐ 100,000-1,000,000 ☐ More than 1,000,000
6. Either parent's highest level of formal education completed: ☐ None ☐ Some primary education ☐ Graduated primary school/some middle school ☐ Graduated middle school/some high school ☐ Graduated high school but no college ☐ Some college ☐ College graduate ☐ Some graduate school ☐ Holds graduate degree
7. What is your college major? \_\_\_\_\_
8. What is your family's monthly household income? ☐ Below 1000 RMB ☐ 1000-2000 RMB ☐ 2000-3000 RMB  
☐ 3000-4000 RMB ☐ Above 4000 RMB
9. In the past week, how much time did you spend on the internet or in an internet café? ☐ None ☐ Less than 1 hour ☐ 1-2 hours ☐ 2-7 hours  
☐ More than 7 hours
10. Have you ever met a Japanese person? ☐ Yes ☐ No
11. Do you know any Japanese people personally (i.e. are friends with a Japanese person or sit near a Japanese person in class)? ☐ Yes ☐ No
12. What is your nationality? ☐ Han ☐ Hui ☐ Manchurian  
☐ Uighur ☐ Tibetan ☐ Mongolian ☐ Mixed: \_\_\_\_\_ ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_
13. What is your religion? ☐ None ☐ Buddhist ☐ Christian ☐ Daoist ☐ Muslim ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_
14. Which do you think tastes better: rice or noodles? ☐ Rice ☐ Noodles
15. Were you born on an even or odd day? ☐ Even ☐ Odd
16. Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Part 4: Knowledge of Japan. Below is a map of Asia. Please place an "X" on Japan.



Who is the current Prime Minister of Japan? \_\_\_\_\_

Which article of Japan's constitution prohibits the formation of offensive military capabilities? \_\_\_\_\_

Part 5: Questions used by other surveys. Place an "X" in the blank next to the answer which best matches your opinion.

- My impression of Japan is: ☐ Very Good ☐ Good ☐ OK ☐ Bad ☐ Very Bad ☐ Neutral/No opinion
- Sino-Japanese relations are currently: ☐ Very Good ☐ Good ☐ OK ☐ Bad ☐ Very Bad ☐ Neutral/No opinion
- Japan can be trusted to behave responsibly. ☐ Agree ☐ Neutral ☐ Disagree
- Japan's influence on the world is: ☐ Very Good ☐ Good ☐ OK ☐ Bad ☐ Very Bad ☐ Neutral/No opinion
- The quality of Japanese products is: ☐ Excellent ☐ Very Good ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor ☐ Neutral/No opinion

**APPENDIX A: TENTATIVE SURVEY FORMS, PAGE THREE, 中文译文 CHINESE VERSION (前面/问题 FRONT SIDE/QUESTIONS)**

缺少足够的时间翻译前面的问题。不好意思！

**APPENDIX A: TENTATIVE SURVEY FORMS, PAGE FOUR, 中文译文 CHINESE VERSION (后面/人口统计 BACK SIDE/DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION)**

缺少足够的时间翻译前面的问题。不好意思！

## APPENDIX B: TENTATIVE FOCUS GROUP TOPICS AND FORMAT (ENGLISH VERSION)

Before beginning the discussion, all participants should fill out a card with their basic demographic information (the same as on the survey) and give the cards to the moderator.

Part one: Briefly introduce all members of the panel to one another.

Part two: Pose general questions to the group on the issues shown to be of interest based on the content analysis of student blogs.

Tentative questions:

- \*What is the biggest issue preventing Sino-Japanese friendship today?
- \*Have any of you met a Japanese person before? What do you think of him/her/them?
- \*What do you think of the Chinese government's position towards Japan?
- \*Should Japan apologize in writing for past aggression, and if they did, should Chinese people stop bringing up the subject?
- \*How do you view the relationship between China and Japan? Is it friendly/competitive/distrustful/openly adversarial?
- \*Should Japan be allowed to be a "normal state" with a military having offensive capability? Why/why not?
- \*Is Japan trying to prevent China's rise? Is the USA? Are they working together to do this? If anyone believes this, ask them if this issue shapes their opinion of Japan more or less than the "history issue".
- \*If a Chinese person likes Japan, does that make him/her less Chinese?
- \*Many Westerners don't understand why China is suddenly so angry with Japan about WWII--they think it all happened such a long time ago and the best thing to do is move on. What would you say to someone in the West who believed this?
- \*Many in the West also believe that China and its people want to portray itself as a victim of aggression throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century and modern history. Do you agree that for the past 150 years China has been a victim? Or has China and its people had more victories?
- \*If China's military becomes much stronger than Japan's, will China attack Japan for revenge? If not, should it? Why/why not?

Part three: Ask individuals who have spoken less to answer specific questions.

Tentative questions:

- \*At what age did you first learn about WWII/The Second Sino-Japanese War?
- \*What do you think of the Anti-Japanese protests/protestors in 2005?
- \*Would you ever consider joining a protest against the Japanese or for any other reason?
- \*If your friends/roommates wanted you to join a protest, would you? Why/why not?
- \*Do you feel pressure from the government to think about Japan in a certain way?
- \*What do you think Japanese students think of China and Chinese people?
- \*Do you think it is more important to maintain stability in society or express what one deeply believes, even if it affects societal harmony in a negative way?

Part four: Open discussion of any issues of interest to panel members. Japanese panel member poses questions or rebuts/challenges panel members' statements.

Part five: Thank all members involved, assure them of confidentiality to the best of our abilities.

## APPENDIX B: TENTATIVE FOCUS GROUP TOPICS AND FORMAT 活动团题目与计划 (CHINESE VERSION 中文译文)

首先, 请让所有参加生把人口统计写在卡上, 把卡换给主人。

一。介绍

二。背景问题

三。特定的问题

四。让日本成员提问

五。谢谢大家, 保护个人机密

## APPENDIX C: ESTIMATED BUDGET ITINERARY (THIS IS JUST A THOUGHT EXERCISE, AND I HOPE ITS BLATANT INACCURACY WON'T BE REFLECTED IN THE FINAL GRADE.)

### TRAVEL, ROOM AND BOARD

ITEM AND DESCRIPTION: Roundtrip ticket to China from USA- \$1500  
Three 30-day visas for PRC- \$150  
Meals per diem- \$5 x 90 days- \$450  
Incidental local travel per diem- \$2 x 90 days- \$180  
Lodging per diem- \$12 x 90 days- \$1080  
Primary researcher rail travel- \$500  
Chinese research team rail travel- \$500

SUBTOTAL FOR SECTION: \$2,000,000

### SALARIES

ITEM AND DESCRIPTION: 3-month contract team leader- \$300  
1-month contract research team member- \$100 x 9- \$900  
Temporary data entrants- \$1 per hour up to \$100

SUBTOTAL FOR SECTION: \$2,000,000

### INCIDENTAL EXPENSES

ITEM AND DESCRIPTION: Paper, printing and photocopying- \$100  
Recording media for focus groups- \$100-1000  
Hard alcohol and other bribes- \$500  
Petty cash- \$2000

SUBTOTAL FOR SECTION: \$2,000,000

GRAND TOTAL: \$6,000,000.37 (and well worth it, Mr. Philanthropist!)

**APPENDIX D: CURRICULUM VITAE OF PRIMARY RESEARCHER (AGAIN, WOULD BE ACCURATE IN A FINALIZED, FORMAL PROPOSAL)**

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**APPENDIX E: SOME MAJOR SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICTS SINCE 1895**

1895- Chinese lose first Sino-Japanese War, Manchuria ceded to Japan in “unequal treaty” of Shimonoseki.

1919- 3,000 students protest against Japan in Tiananmen Square as part of “May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement”, establishing the spring as protest season for decades to come.

WWII is the “War of Japanese Resistance” or the Second Sino-Japanese War in China. Actually an ongoing conflict for most of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

1982- First “textbook issue” controversy. Many more follow to date.

1985-1986- Many near-protests against Japanese influence in China, first visits by PM to Yasukuni.

1994- Japanese officials call Nanjing Massacre “a fabrication” and WWII “not a war of aggression”.

1996- Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

2001- Major disapproval of new Japanese history textbook, Koizumi first visits Yasukuni (repeated in 2002-2004)

2005- Nationwide anti-Japanese protests in over 25 major Chinese cities, notably excluding Beijing, where heavy security precautions were taken.

See also Rose’s (2004) Appendix 1 for a “Chronology of textbook controversies and trials”, table 4.1’s “List of compensation cases”. and Table 1’s “Issues in Sino-Japanese relations: 1982-2002”.



Japanese-occupied territory 1945

USSR

MONGOLIA

MANCHUKUO 1931

JEHOL 1933

Peiping

KOREA 1905

Yan'an

CHINA

Chongqing

Nanjing

Shanghai

Yellow Sea

East China Sea

JAPAN

Fuzhou

Taiwan 1895

Shantou

Guangzhou

South China Sea

Hainan

BURMA

FRENCH INDO-CHINA

TIBET

International border

CHINA Nation

Nationalist capital

Major city

Communist heartland

Area of Nationalist control

Autonomous region

Japanese-occupied territory

Before 1937, with date of annexation

1937-1940

1941-1943

May 1945

0 500 km

0 500 miles

← JAPANESE COLONIZATION


PROVINCES OF CHINA (PRIMARY RESEARCH LOCATION WILL BE IN EITHER GANSU OR SICHUAN, SECONDARY LOCATIONS INCLUDE THOSE PROVINCES AND ALSO, WORKING "COUNTER-CLOCKWISE" FROM SICHUAN: YUNNAN, GUANGXI, GUANGDONG, JIANGSU, HEILONGJIANG, AND SHAANXI.)

## ← JAPANESE COLONIZATION



PROVINCES OF CHINA (PRIMARY RESEARCH LOCATION WILL BE IN EITHER GANSU OR SICHUAN, SECONDARY LOCATIONS INCLUDE THOSE PROVINCES AND ALSO, WORKING "COUNTER-CLOCKWISE" FROM SICHUAN: YUNNAN, GUANGXI, GUANGDONG, JIANGSU, HEILONGJIANG, AND SHAANXI.)

## APPENDIX G: OTHER GRAPHICS OF INTEREST



CHINESE LAUNDRY DETERGENT ADVERTISEMENT (BEFORE & AFTER)...NOT SO FUNNY WHEN ONE THINKS ABOUT IT A WHILE! IS JAPAN A STAIN ON THE EARTH TO BE ELIMINATED?! THIS AD IS POSTED IN COUNTLESS ONLINE FORUMS. (SEE "Keon" IN APPENDIX H)

### A SAMPLING OF THE 56 OFFICIAL NATIONALITIES OF CHINA



FROM LEFT: HAN (APPROX 92% OF POP.), TIBETAN, MANCHURIAN, UIGHUR (HOLDING FLATBREAD), KOREAN (SAME CHARACTERS AS COUNTRY NAME FOR NORTH KOREA), MONGOLIAN. NOT PICTURED: HUI (MOST POPULOUS MINORITY...ETHNICALLY HAN MUSLIMS)



AND OUR PERSONAL FAVORITE, THE KOOKY, MUTTON-CHOPPED AND TRIPOD-COOKING RUSSIAN MINORITY NATIONALITY OF CHINA (SOURCE: CAO, 2004)

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